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1 Introduction
Recent publications reveal that high fre-
quency trading (HFT) is responsible for
10 to 70 per cent of the order volume in
stock and derivatives trading (Gomber et
al. 2011; Hendershott and Riordan 2011;
Zhang 2010). This observation leads to
a controversial debate over positive and
negative implications of HFT for the liq-
uidity and efficiency of electronic secu-
rities markets and over the costs and
benefits of and needs for market reg-
ulation. Currently the European Union
(EU) is considering the introduction of
a financial transaction tax to curtail the
harmful effects of HFT strategies. The
consideration behind this market pol-
icy is based on the assumption that the
very short-term oriented HFT trading
strategies lead to market frictions. This
current discourse shows that the argu-
ing parties do not homogeneously de-
fine HFT. Reasons for this are the pro-
ponents’ different but intertwined per-
spectives, which lead to new unanswered
questions in numerous subjects of ex-
pertise. From a macroeconomic point of
view the question arises if HFT constrains
or supports the allocation function of fi-
nancial markets. Capital market research
and information management research
raise questions about the future form
of intermediation in securities trading
and the coming architecture of markets,
about the HFT’s impact on liquidity and
about price volatility. Financial authori-
ties and regulators discuss whether HFT
has a stabilizing or destabilizing function
on financial systems and how a future
regulation should be shaped.
This collection of articles shall help to
develop a common definition of HFT
and contribute to the ongoing discus-
sions. To that end we have collected ar-
ticles from representatives of informa-
tion systems, business management, the
Deutsche Bundesbank and the Deutsche
Boerse AG. The following scientists and
practitioners participated in the discus-
sion (in alphabetical order):
 Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Burghof and Arne
Breuer, Chair of Business Economics,
especially Banking and Financial Ser-
vices, University of Hohenheim, Ger-
many.
 Prof. Dr. Peter Gomber, Chair of Busi-
ness Economics, especially e-Finance,
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University
of Frankfurt, Germany.
 Dr. Joachim Nagel, Member of the
Board of Directors, and Dr. Rafael Za-
jonz, Central Market Analysis, Portfo-
lio, Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt,
Germany.
 Rainer Riess, Managing Director of the
Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (FWB),
and Michael Krogmann, Executive
Vice President of Xetra Market Devel-
opment of Deutsche Börse AG, Frank-
furt, Germany.
 Prof. Dr. Ryan Riordan, Institute for
Information Systems and Manage-
ment, Karlsruhe Institute of Technol-
ogy (KIT), Karlsruhe, Germany.
HFT is a part of algorithmic trading. Go-
molka (2011) defines algorithmic trad-
ing as the processing and/or execu-
tion of trading strategies by the means
of intelligent electronic solution rou-
tines (known as algorithms). Thus algo-
rithmic trading encompasses computer-
supported trading as well as computer-
generated sell-side and buy-side market
transactions. Algorithmic trading strate-
gies can be both short-term and long-
term oriented.
In general, HFT is defined as real-time
computer-generated decision making in
financial trading, without human inter-
ference and based on automatized order
generation and order management. HFT
encompasses short-term trading strate-
gies, which – in extreme cases – operate
in the range of microseconds using mini-
mal price differences. HFT thus results in
minimal profit margins per transactions
and exhibits very short holding periods of
securities positions.
However, HFT definitions vary and
various properties of HFT are not
consistently discussed in the literature.
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Aldridge’s (2009) definition of HFT hold-
ing periods range from milliseconds to
one day. Durbin (2010) on the other
hand describes HFT as trading strate-
gies, which covers seconds or millisec-
onds only. According to Brogaard (2010),
HFT is extremely short-term buying or
selling with the intention to profit from
minimal price fluctuations.
Further characteristics are often men-
tioned but are not always included in
HFT definitions, such as the exclusive us-
age by professional/institutional investors
in proprietary trading, real-time data
processing and direct market access (Da-
corogna et al. 2001). Another controver-
sial issue is the avoidance of overnight
risk (Aldridge 2009). Other definitions
underline the role of HFT as financial
intermediary (Hendershott and Riordan
2011) or try to find differences among
the implemented trading strategies (Ye
2011).
On the basis of the broad HFT defini-
tion given before the authors in this arti-
cle will shed light on the following ques-
tions: (1) How does HFT influence the
liquidity and efficiency of electronic secu-
rities markets? (2) What are the costs and
benefits of, and what are the needs for a
HFT regulation?
Peter Gomber analyzes HFT from a
market microstructure perspective, and
finds HFT to be a central element of the
value creation chain in securities trad-
ing. As part of the value creation chain,
HFT contributes to increased efficiency
and reduced explicit and implicit transac-
tion costs. In his eyes, regulation of HFT
could lead to dramatic changes in market
behavior, while an inappropriate regula-
tion might even be counterproductive for
market quality. Gomber sees the prob-
lems for profound research on HFT in the
lack of data available for empirical stud-
ies. Again this leads to adverse effects in
discussions of the topic in the public, in
the media, and with regulators.
Ryan Riordan also looks at HFT from
the perspective of market microstructure
and interprets HFT as one form of tech-
nological financial intermediation which
contributes to the efficiency of opera-
tions in exchange trading. In his eyes,
HFT plays an important role in the pro-
cess of price formation and influences the
size of transaction costs in securities trad-
ing. According to him, one cannot yet
say whether HFT will have a positive or
a negative impact on the capital markets.
However, he sees major advantages in a
highly technologized market. It is no al-
ternative for him to turn back the wheels
and return to a backward oriented, artifi-
cially slowed, regulated trading, which is
based on human intermediation.
Rainer Riess and Michael Krogmann
describe HFT as the highest evolution-
ary level of securities trading. In their
opinion HFT leads to faster processing
of information, to an increase in liq-
uidity, and thus added values for the
overall economy. The authors describe
how HFT is currently technically real-
ized and integrated into trading opera-
tions at the exchange, and deduct their
arguments accordingly. From the point of
view of Deutsche Börse, HFT is mainly
used by institutional investors in pro-
prietary trading and focuses on highly
liquid stocks. The authors correlate the
rise of HFT with a continuous improve-
ment of the electronic trading system XE-
TRA, which – from the point of view
of Deutsche Börse – benefits all market
participants in the same way. In the eyes
of Riess and Krogmann, a future regula-
tion of HFT should primarily focus on
equal chances of competition in the EU-
area, in order to create “a level playing
field“. From the point of view of Deutsche
Börse, it is necessary not only to imple-
ment security mechanisms on the side of
exchanges but also with HFT-firms.
Arne Breuer and Hans-Peter Burghof
also recognize that, due to HFT, infor-
mation can be processed more perfectly
and faster than ever before. They look at
the topic from the perspective of finan-
cial economics. This point of view leads
them to believe that more and faster in-
formation does not necessarily lead to
a correct determination of the intrin-
sic value of financial instruments. Rather
HFT processes short-term information,
which primarily is made of short-term
volume and short-term time series data,
and thus does not contribute to the eval-
uation of the intrinsic values. The au-
thors vote for a stricter regulation of HFT.
However, before this can be done, more
analyses should be conducted. For this,
more data are necessary.
Finally, Joachim Nagel und Rafael Za-
jonz argue from the perspective of reg-
ulators. A blanket judgment on HFT is
from the regulators’ point of view nei-
ther adequate nor would it lead to im-
provements of the regulatory framework
regarding transparency, stability, and ef-
ficiency. The impact of HFT on the effi-
ciency of securities trading is – due to the
absence of a scientific discussion – still
unclear for the regulators. The possibility
to destabilize the market due to HFT in
volatile market situations is regarded as
critical but should be looked into in de-
tail. From the point of view of the authors
“market friendly” strategies exist, a fact
which can be judged positively. But there
are also ”unfriendly strategies“, which –
from their perspective – can be catego-
rized as potentially harmful. In the cen-
ter of their article, the authors formu-
late the wish that this complex topic may
be discussed more intensely by the sci-
entific community in the future, in order
to better understand which fundamental,
regulatory measures should be applied to
HFT.
If you would like to comment
on this topic or another article of
the journal Business & Information
Systems Engineering, please send
your contribution (max. 2 pages) to
the editor-in-chief, Prof. Hans Ul-
rich Buhl, University of Augsburg,
Hans-Ulrich.Buhl@wiwi.uni-augsburg.de.
Prof. Dr. Christoph Lattemann
School of Humanities and Social
Sciences
Jacobs University Bremen





2 High Frequency Trading
Regulation Required at a
Reasonable Level
It is uncommon for a specific subject
in the field of securities trading and IT-
innovation to draw as much public atten-
tion as high frequency trading (HFT) has
been doing in recent months. Merely a
special field for a small group of experts
prior to 2010, it is now a frequent part
of the general news coverage. Against the
background of the recent debt crisis, the
current volatility and market turmoil as
well as the “US Flash Crash” on May 6,
2010 lead to this extreme attention. Sev-
eral parties attempt to exert pressure on
politics and regulation by making HFT
responsible for that crisis and the high
market volatility. In reaction to the afore-
mentioned incidents and to the subse-
quent public discussions, the regulatory
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authorities of international financial cen-
ters have debated the adoption of vari-
ous regulatory measures and now pro-
pose regulatory procedures, which cur-
rently substantiate especially in Europe
and will presumably be approved in 2012
in the context of the revision of the Mar-
kets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID).
Basically, the trading strategies based
on HFT can be subdivided into ac-
tive and passive ones. Whereas passive
strategies provide other market partici-
pants with trading opportunities in terms
of quotes and limit orders (e.g. elec-
tronic market making), active strate-
gies primarily attempt to exploit imbal-
ances of asset prices in fragmented mar-
kets (e.g. primary market and multilat-
eral trading facilities), discrepancies in
valuation between different asset classes
(e.g. between derivatives and their un-
derlyings) or deviances of current as-
set valuations compared to historical
correlations (e.g. in the so-called pairs
trading) immediately after the emer-
gence of these trading/arbitrage opportu-
nities.
The emerging academic literature,
which analyzes the effects of HFT based
strategies on market quality, shows
mostly positive impact (for a system-
atic outline of academic research con-
cerning HFT see Gomber et al. 2011).
Regarding price discovery, liquidity and
volatility, most studies discover positive
effects of HFT. Only a few publications
indicate that HFT can increase the ad-
verse selection problem under specific
circumstances, and in the case of the “US
Flash Crash” another survey (Kirilenko
et al. 2011) reveals that HFT can increase
volatility.
The growing market efficiency and a
reduction of explicit and implicit trans-
action costs triggered by HFT is an ob-
vious issue particularly for those mar-
ket participants who used to capitalize on
intermediary services and broad bid/ask
spreads in a formerly less efficient and
less liquid trading environment. In con-
trast to off-exchange trading via inter-
nalization and so-called dark pools, i.e.
non-transparent execution venues, HFT
market-making strategies on lit markets
face relevant adverse selection costs as
they provide liquidity on the market
without knowing their counterparties.
Within their internalization systems and
dark pools in the OTC field, banks and
brokers are aware of their counterparties’
identities and can benefit from this infor-
mation. Contrary to this, HFTs in lit mar-
kets are not aware of the toxicity of their
counterparts and are – analogous to mar-
ket makers – exposed to the problem of
adverse selection.
Inappropriate regulation of HFT based
strategies or an impact on HFT business
models due to excessive burdens might
turn out to be counterproductive and
lead to unforeseeable consequences for
the quality of markets. However, abusive
strategies have to be combated effectively
by the regulators. Particularly the analy-
sis of the “US Flash Crash” with its dis-
cussed solution approaches can hardly
be transferred to the European situation,
since the issues related to the “US Flash
Crash” primarily result from the US mar-
ket structure. In Europe, where a more
flexible best execution regime is imple-
mented and a share-by-share volatility
safeguard regime has been in place for
two decades, no market quality problems
related to HFT have been documented so
far. Therefore, a European approach to
the subject matter is required, and Eu-
rope should be cautious about address-
ing and fixing a problem that exists in a
different market structure and thus creat-
ing risks for market efficiency and market
quality.
Any regulatory interventions in Europe
should try to preserve the benefits of HFT
while mitigating the risks as far as pos-
sible by assuring that (i) HFT firms are
able to provide documentation on their
algorithms upon authorities’ request and
to conduct back-testing, (ii) markets are
capable of handling peaks in trading ac-
tivity and apply safeguards to react to
technical issues of their members’ algo-
rithms, (iii) a diversity of trading strate-
gies prevails to prevent systemic risks,
(iv) co-location and proximity services
are implemented on a level playing field,
(v) regulators have a complete overview
of the possible systemic risks which could
be triggered by HFT, and have employ-
ees who have the knowledge and the tools
to assess the impact of the trading al-
gorithms on market quality and the as-
sociated risks. Furthermore, it is crucial
that market places in a fragmented envi-
ronment develop coordinated safeguards
und circuit breakers, which mirror the
HFT reality and enable all market partic-
ipants to react adequately even in market
stress.
Regulatory proposals demanding con-
tinuous liquidity provision by HFT in the
sense of market marking obligations or
minimum quote lifetimes miss the mark
and are not suitable to improve market
stability or market integrity. They rather
contribute to a decrease in market quality
and higher transaction costs.
At first sight, demanding obligations
for HFTs to provide quotes seems an ap-
propriate measure to tackle the problem
of a sudden liquidity withdrawal. How-
ever, it is highly doubtful whether any
rule can force market makers to buy in
the face of overwhelming selling pres-
sure. In such a situation they might rather
take the risk of being fined for not fulfill-
ing their obligations. Many HFT strate-
gies are characterized by rapid closing
of built-up positions to minimize risk.
Hence, an obligation to provide liquidity
and thereby risk capital is in sharp con-
trast to many HFT business models. Due
to the significant regulatory costs those
obligations would potentially lead to a
retreat from the market and thus to a
notable loss of liquidity.
Also a minimum order lifetime, which
at first glance appears to be useful to
avoid fast order submissions and im-
mediate cancellations, would lead to a
significant change in market behavior.
Market participants are then no longer
able to react quickly and adequately to
market-exogenous information (e.g. ad-
hoc news) and the necessity to keep an
order in the order book presents a free
option for other market participants. Be-
sides, the existence of minimum order
lifetimes would lead to an implementa-
tion of trading strategies capitalizing on
the “lock in” of orders. HFT would an-
ticipate the accompanied risks and costs
and attempt to compensate these costs
with higher spreads, which again would
have negative effects on market quality.
In this debate it should not be neglected
that speed is the key tool for HFTs’ risk
management.
HFT is an important factor in mar-
kets that are driven by sophisticated tech-
nology on all layers of the trading value
chain. However, discussions on this topic
often lack sufficient and precise informa-
tion. A remarkable gap between the re-
sults of academic research on HFT and
its perceived impact on markets in public,
media and regulatory discussions (Euro-
pean Commission 2010) can be observed.
Here, the provision of granular and reli-
able data by the industry can assist em-
pirical research at the interface of finance
and IS to provide important contribu-
tions to a reasonable regulation of HFT.
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This regulation should eventually mini-
mize the inherent risks of the technol-
ogy in question without hindering the
indisputably existing positive effects for
market quality.
Prof. Dr. Peter Gomber
University of Frankfurt
E-Finance Lab
3 High Frequency Trading (HFT) –
A New Intermediary
Financial markets require intermediaries
to provide liquidity and immediacy for
other participants. These intermediaries,
often called market makers or special-
ists, were often afforded special status
and located on the trading floor, or close
to the trading mechanism of exchanges.
The automation of financial markets has
increased their trading capacity and in-
termediaries have expanded their use of
technology. This has resulted in a reduced
role for traditional human market mak-
ers and led to the rise of a new intermedi-
ary, referred to as high frequency traders
(HFTs).
This development has been made pos-
sible by the technological innovations in
recent years. HFT strategies usually make
use of the high speed technologies to
build up and unwind positions within
milli- and microseconds. Prerequisites
for this development were the reduc-
tion of system latency and the increase
of computing power and data process-
ing capabilities of computers. Next to the
large investments in HFT, exchanges have
also invested large amounts of money in
their IT infrastructure. For example, the
costs of a high-speed connection between
Chicago and New York are estimated
around $200,000 per mile (Forbes 2010).
The question remains whether these in-
vestments are justified with regard to the
increase of overall market quality and
welfare that results from higher HFT
activity on the market.
Like traditional intermediaries HFTs
hold little inventory, have short hold-
ing periods, and trade often. Unlike tra-
ditional intermediaries, however, HFTs
are not granted preferential access to the
market not available to others and they
employ advanced and innovative tech-
nology to intermediate trading. With-
out such privileges, there is no clear ba-
sis for imposing the traditional obliga-
tions of market makers on HFT. The sub-
stantial, largely negative media coverage
of HFT and the so called “flash crash”
on May 6, 2010 raise significant interest
and concerns about the role HFT play in
the stability and price efficiency of finan-
cial markets. The predominantly negative
coverage seems mostly unfounded.
Overall, HFTs’ impact is similar to
that of other intermediaries and specu-
lators. Speculators can improve price ef-
ficiency by obtaining more information
on prices and by trading against pric-
ing errors. Manipulative strategies and
predatory trading could decrease price
efficiency. Reducing pricing errors im-
proves the efficiency of prices. HFTs’ in-
formational advantage, which is driven
by the technology they employ, is short-
term. It is unclear whether or not this
short-term information and intraday re-
ductions of pricing errors facilitate better
financial decisions and resource alloca-
tions by firms and investors. If the short-
term information – that HFTs price in –
would not otherwise become public mi-
croseconds later, HFT clearly plays an im-
portant role (Hendershott and Riordan
2011). It would be an important positive
role of smaller pricing errors if these cor-
responded to lower implicit transaction
costs by long-term investors.
One important point left unaddressed
thus far is whether or not HFTs engage in
manipulative or predatory trading. Their
use of technology may allow HFTs to ma-
nipulate prices at speeds that are unde-
tectable by slower traders. A manipula-
tive strategy might be the ignition of a
price movement in one direction only in
order to trade on the opposite side of the
market as proposed by the SEC (2010)
and therefore cause significant pricing
errors. As is frequently done, one can
argue whether the underlying problem
of possible manipulation lies with the
manipulator or the market participant
who is manipulated. In the SEC exam-
ple, the passive manipulation could not
succeed if there were no price matching.
The manipulation stories could be tested
with more detailed data identifying each
market participant’s orders, trading, and
positions in all markets.
Despite the strong evidence of the pos-
itive role of HFT for the efficiency of
price determination and trading costs
(Hendershott et al. 2011; Brogaard 2010;
Zhang and Riordan 2011), regulators and
the media are certain that they must be
regulated. It is, however, unclear and also
debatable how we should regulate HFT.
Assuming that some, or most, of their
activities contribute positively to liquid-
ity and price efficiency, which parts of
their trading should we regulate? There
are controversially discussed suggestions
to restrict HFTs’ mostly passive trading or
to enforce a minimum order life on limit
orders. Restricting HFTs’ ability to trade
actively necessarily impedes their ability
to manage the risks associated with in-
termediation. This may lead to less in-
termediation and lower liquidity. Impos-
ing minimum order lives on limit or-
ders may also negatively impact HFTs’
ability to manage trading risks during
volatile market periods that existed be-
fore HFT dominated the equity market.
Finally, the discussions of US and Euro-
pean regulation should take into account
specific differences of both markets. De-
spite the high market fragmentation, the
European market has maintained a com-
parably high degree of efficiency. This is
also due to the help of HFTs. They make
use of arbitrage strategies to dissolve ex-
isting price deviations within seconds
which results in an interconnectedness of
European markets.
A final point is a more general one
on technology investments. HFTs must
make a large and long-term investment in
technology, both hardware and software.
This investment in technology seems to
have to paid-off both for HFTs and the
equity markets. If regulation were to
negatively impact the returns on invest-
ments in HFT technologies by reducing
the profitability of intermediation, fewer
firms will be willing to invest in these
technologies. This may lead to a situ-
ation in which one or two highly spe-
cialized firms dominate intermediation,
which ultimately leads to less competi-
tion, lower liquidity and reduced price-
efficiency. Competition, ease of market
entry and the use of specialized and in-
novative technology seem to be the best
guarantors of market stability.
It is hard to imagine a situation in
which HFTs are able to artificially ma-
nipulate prices for longer periods of
time given the intense competition other
HFTs. HFTs are one type of intermediary.
When thinking about the role HFT plays
in markets it is natural to try to compare
the new market structure to the previ-
ous market structure. Some primary dif-
ferences are that there is free entry into
HFT, HFTs do not have a designated role
with special privileges, and HFTs do not
have special obligations. When consider-
ing the optimal industrial organization of
the intermediation sector, which includes
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regulation, market structure, technology
and incumbency, HFT more closely re-
sembles a highly competitive environ-
ment than traditional market structures.
A central question is whether there were
benefits of the more highly regulated and
less technology intensive intermediation
sector which outweigh the costs of lower
innovation and higher entry costs typi-
cally associated with regulation. The an-
swer to this question seems thus far to be
a resounding “no”.
Prof. Dr. Ryan Riordan
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
4 High Frequency Trading – An
Exchange Operator’s Perspective
4.1 High Frequency Trading – Myth and
Reality
On 2010-09-30, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC) (2010) issued a joint report
showing that the so-called “flash crash”,
a sequence of events which made prices
plunge throughout the US stock mar-
ket, was caused by an incorrectly pro-
grammed trading algorithm of a tradi-
tional investment company which did
not use high frequency trading (HFT).
Nevertheless, HFT has gained massive
public attention ever since. The news me-
dia, as well scientists and regulatory au-
thorities, are busy discussing and analyz-
ing the effect of HFT on the global capi-
tal markets. While the public perception
of HFT is largely critical – and driven by
headlines demanding a HFT ban or, at
least, strict regulation – scientific analysis
comes to rather different conclusions (see
Gomber’s discussion above). According
to Brogaard’s (2010) study of HFT, blam-
ing HFT for the US flash crash is not
the only popular fallacy regarding the
role of HFT in securities trading. Bro-
gaard’s analysis of NASDAQ data showed
that for 65% of the time HFT accounted
for the best bid and ask quotes. Also,
Broogard found no evidence suggesting
that HFT firms systematically engage in
market abuse, e.g. by illegally taking ad-
vantage of information about client or-
ders, the so-called “front running”. Since
HFT firms are proprietary traders, they
do not have any clients. Generally, sci-
entific analysis did not find a correla-
tion between HFT and market abuse.
The Netherlands Authority for the Finan-
cial Markets (AFM 2010) considers HFT
as a legitimate trading method which is
not market abusive under normal cir-
cumstances. According to Gomber, aca-
demic papers mostly could not find ev-
idence for negative effects of HFT on
market quality. Moreover, the Germany-
based Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
(KIT) concluded their study based on
analysis of NASDAQ data with the find-
ing that HFT even worked as a buffer
against plunging stock prices during the
crisis years 2008 and 2009 (Zhang and
Riordan 2011).
4.2 Insights of an Exchange Operator
We live in a technology-driven society,
continuously striving to further improve
and advance the achievement potential
of our economy as well as of nearly
every aspect in our everyday life: can
anyone imagine a commercial flight to-
day without the aid of an autopilot, or
modern microsurgery without robotics?
These advancements are by no means
ends in themselves but serve a greater
good. Just the same goes for the ever
increasing speed in securities trading –
a development which leads to continu-
ously improving general market quality
and also to more efficient risk manage-
ment for every market participant. The
faster the market data transmission, the
faster investors are able to adapt to ongo-
ing market developments. This does not
only have a very positive effect on the
safety in securities trading but also on
transaction cost: faster trading leads to
tighter spreads and, therefore, to higher
liquidity. The implicit transaction costs
of every securities trade are determined
mainly by liquidity and account for up
to 80 percent of the overall transaction
costs, while the explicit transaction costs
– commissions, fees, taxes – are of minor
significance. With this in mind, Deutsche
Börse started long before the advent of
HFT to improve the trading infrastruc-
ture of its electronic trading platform Xe-
tra, especially in view of ever decreas-
ing systemic latency. At the same time,
Deutsche Börse further developed the se-
curity mechanisms and technologies re-
spectively adapted them to the increas-
ing demands of a more and more sophis-
ticated and faster trading system, one of
them being the very effective instrument
of the volatility interruption, introduced
in 1999. This security mechanism is used
in extremely volatile market phases and
leads to higher price stability: whenever
an indicative price is outside the price
range – which is pre-defined for every se-
curity traded on Xetra – a volatility in-
terruption will be initiated around the
reference price.
While continuously advancing the
technical infrastructure, Deutsche Börse
expanded its offer of individually se-
lectable bandwidths for market par-
ticipants connected to Xetra from
512 Kbit/sec up to 2 Mbit/sec for their
Values API interfaces. In 2008, for Xe-
tra members requiring even faster mar-
ket data transmission and more order
book depth, an additional interface with
a bandwidth of 1 Gbit/sec was imple-
mented, called Enhanced Broadcast So-
lution respectively Enhanced Transaction
Solution. Today, bandwidths of up to 10
GBit/sec are available. With the intro-
duction of the so-called “non-persistent”
orders in 2009, Deutsche Börse further
enabled Xetra members to optimize their
response times to price changes thanks
to even faster data processing. “Non-
persistent” orders are not saved in ex-
change systems and are thus designed not
be executed after volatility interruptions.
In late 2011 Deutsche Börse comple-
mented its connectivity portfolio with
the FIX (Financial Information Ex-
change) gateway. Market participants us-
ing this protocol now are able to connect
to Xetra far more easily.
However, there was one latency factor
left that even the most sophisticated tech-
nology could not overcome: the propaga-
tion delay due to physical distance. For
every 100 km which a market partici-
pant’s trading engine and the trading sys-
tem of Xetra are physically apart, transac-
tion latency increases by 1 msec approxi-
mately. This could mean a true competi-
tive disadvantage for market participants
relying on ultra low latency. Deutsche
Börse addressed this growing market de-
mand by introducing its proximity ser-
vices in 2006. By placing the trading en-
gine of distant Xetra members not only
virtually but physically close to the ex-
change back end – a process called co-
location – the travel time of the mar-
ket data could be drastically reduced. To-
day, 141 Xetra members take advantage
of Deutsche Börse’s co-location offer.
Thanks to a continuously perfected
trading infrastructure and the intro-
duction of proximity services, Deutsche
Börse has not only remained competitive
on an international level but has also pre-
pared Xetra optimally for the needs of
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HFT firms. Over the last few years, sys-
temic latency on Xetra has been further
reduced notwithstanding a dramatic in-
crease of technical transactions – an ad-
vantage to all market participants alike:
a fair, equal access to Xetra and the pre-
and post-trade transparency characteris-
tic of a regulated exchange make sure
that every investor enjoys all advantages
Deutsche Börse’s trading platform has to
offer.
While being a minority, HFT firms
nevertheless play an important role in
improving the order book quality on Xe-
tra, e.g. by bundling the very hetero-
genic order flow. There are three orga-
nized forms of HFT on Xetra: the propri-
etary trading of investment firms, hedge
funds, and proprietary trading compa-
nies. Two types of trading prevail: first of
all, the so-called electronic liquidity pro-
vision. In this case, HFT firms act as vol-
untary market makers, adding liquidity
to a multitude of securities. The second
type of HFT on Xetra is called statistical
arbitrage which leads to improved price
discovery. Both types of HFT account
for tighter spreads and, ultimately, im-
proved market efficiency on Xetra. So far,
Deutsche Börse could find no evidence of
HFT having lead to destabilizing markets
during periods of market turmoil, e.g. by
strengthening trends. During the highly
volatile market phase in August 2011, the
trading volume on Xetra increased tem-
porarily to 107 million transactions on
one single day. Despite up to 30 volatil-
ity interruptions, the average transaction
processing took only 0.4 msec longer
than usual. System availability was guar-
anteed at all times, Xetra members did
not have to face any restrictions, let alone
system failure. Deutsche Börse’s market
security mechanisms made sure that all
trading activities could be executed prop-
erly and continuously while price stabil-
ity was guaranteed even during market
turmoil.
Thus, Deutsche Börse succeeded in ad-
vancing the Xetra infrastructure in terms
of continuously decreasing systemic la-
tency and, at the same time, met the
permanently increasing needs regarding
safety and speed of its trading system
even before the term HFT came up.
4.3 Regulatory Recommendations
Within a national economy it is the ex-
plicit function of a securities exchange to
facilitate the most efficient employment
of capital, ensuring best possible corpo-
rate financing and re-financing. HFT, as
it is today, supports faster processing of
economically relevant data and leads to
higher liquidity in the trading of com-
pany shares. Thanks to a stable, high-
performance trading system, Deutsche
Börse was able to integrate HFT success-
fully and to use the positive effects of
HFT to improve overall market quality.
This would not have been possible with-
out Deutsche Börse’s principle of equal
access and a fair set of rules applying to
every market participant trading on Xe-
tra alike. From a regulatory perspective
– and keeping MiFID’s ultimate goal of
creating an EU-wide “level playing field”
in mind – comprehensive rules regard-
ing HFT definitely would make sense.
Therefore, Deutsche Börse supports all
measures to enhance transparency, e.g.
the complete registration of all market
participants and a full recording of all
their trading activities – traditional trad-
ing and HFT alike. The Deutsche Börse
(2011) has come to the conclusion that
regulatory intervention in HFT must not
hurt the proven positive effect on mar-
ket quality HFT has to offer. In particu-
lar, the variety of HFT strategies should
be preserved, as systemic risk should be
prevented. To achieve these goals, HFT
firms themselves may have to implement
security mechanisms – just as exchange
operators as Deutsche Börse already have.
Whichever regulatory rules may be im-
plemented in the end, the regulators will
have to make sure that these rules apply
to every European market and to every





5 Paradigm Change Through
Algorithmic Trading
5.1 Introduction
Algorithmic trading nowadays often ac-
counts for more than half of trade vol-
ume and order volume at large stock
exchanges. Its net effects are generally
found positive by researchers. Only few
voices from the scientific community –
more, however, from traders – point out
negative effects of algorithmic trading. A
notable difference lies between empirical
findings – that usually find positive ef-
fects – on the one hand, and some theo-
retical works and especially the sentiment
of traders, who often express their frus-
tration about their computerized coun-
terparts, on the other hand.
5.2 Availability of Data
Most scientific studies about algorith-
mic trading share one fundamental prob-
lem: data about algorithmic trading are
scarce. As one of the few stock ex-
changes, Deutsche Börse had for some
time quite reliable data on algorith-
mic trading. Their “Automated Trading
Program“ (ATP), which was in effect
from 2007 to early 2009, enabled them
to distinguish between algorithmic or-
ders and human ones (Deutsche Börse
2009). Hendershott and Riordan (2011),
Gsell (2009), Groth (2009), and Maurer
and Schäfer (2011) analyze such datasets
which contain flags for orders placed
within the ATP environment. Their re-
search questions differ, but they all more
or less conclude that the overall effect of
algorithmic trading is positive.
A fundamental critique of such analy-
ses is that algorithms usually work well
in “normal” markets and then show the
often-found positive effects. The models
that algorithms base on are abstractions
of reality and must fail to reflect it in its
entirety. If a market situation is not part
of the possibility space of the model, sev-
eral options are possible: The algorithm
halts trading and waits until the market is
“normal” again, thereby facing the risk to
generate possibly considerable losses. An-
other option is to continue trading using
the usual model, thus failing to trade op-
timally and possibly worsening the situa-
tion. Since the flash crash on May 6, 2010,
there have been repeated miniature flash
crashes that did not affect the whole mar-
ket but only individual stocks. For both
phenomena, algorithms are blamed to be
the cause of the market irregularities.
However, an effective approach to reg-
ulation should base on well-established
results. A lot of work has to be done
here. Above all, the insufficient availabil-
ity of appropriate data confines scien-
tific progress. The deduction of the ef-
fect of algorithmic trading on the mar-
ket from anonymous order book data can
only be very rudimentary. In our current
work, we attempt to find a way to an-
alyze algorithmic trading activity whilst
only using anonymous order book data
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(Breuer and Burghof 2011). A manda-
tory flagging of algorithmic orders would
be desirable. Only then would it be pos-
sible to independently analyze algorith-
mic trading from many points of view
and estimate the effect on the market.
The restrictive handling of historic ATP
data by Deutsche Börse does not build
confidence but could increase the prob-
ability that the sentiment towards AT is
influenced by irrational fears.
5.3 Information Efficiency
Recent studies (Hendershott and Riordan
2011; Gsell 2009; Groth 2009; Maurer
and Schäfer 2011) analyze rather short-
term aspects of market microstructure in
an AT environment. Indeed, its existence
alters behavioral incentives of other mar-
ket participants fundamentally and in the
long run. It is apparent that algorithms
process new information ever faster and
– assuming normal market conditions –
probably calculate its price impact better
than humans. It is still to be seen, how-
ever, how accurate trading algorithms
process information without slow human
traders monitoring them. Sometimes, the
superfast processing of news can be un-
desirable. An example for this is the news
about the bankruptcy of United Airways.
The airline’s stock price plummeted un-
til it became clear that the news was al-
ready a couple months old. Because the
possibility to extract yields from new in-
formation has a very short and decreas-
ing half-life, systems tend to react hastily
and without challenging the information.
Especially in delicate market situations,
rumors can develop a destructive power.
The effect that is likely to be most
important has however escaped scien-
tific analysis so far. Capital markets are a
highly efficient instrument of capital al-
location, especially because a large num-
ber of actors feed information into the
price via their trading activity. This in-
formation comes from various sources;
it may be obtained haphazardly or with
some effort. Algorithmic trading uncov-
ers trade activity which is caused by that
information and uses this knowledge to
pocket a considerable part of the infor-
mation yield. The better these algorithms
work, the less money the informed per-
son will make out of this information. In
the long run, this could mean that the
costly generation of information turns
unprofitable, and in an extreme case even
the trade based on incidentally obtained
information does not pay anymore.
In such a hypothetical market, ever less
information is traded ever more perfectly
and faster. The market draws nearer and
nearer the weak form of market efficiency
(Fama 1970) or eventually even the semi-
strong form of market efficiency. At the
same time, it moves away from the strong
form of market efficiency, because the in-
centive to feed information into the mar-
ket becomes considerably less powerful.
It is this very effect that traders witness
when they trade against algorithms. They
know that information-based strategies
are detected rapidly and thwarted by ap-
propriate front-running strategies (Biais
et al. 2010; Cvitanic and Kirilenko 2010).
Surly, there is still a need for theoretical
as well as empirical analysis here, because
due to these thoughts, the usefulness of
algorithmic trading is subject to scrutiny.
5.4 Regulation and Regulatory
Instruments
Regulatory considerations have to distin-
guish between the different types of algo-
rithms. Limit orders which are bogus or-
ders or part of quote-stuffing techniques
have to be considered under the light of
laws against market manipulation (e.g.,
§20a (1) No. 2 of the German Securities
Trading Act [WpHG]). Other strategies
improve the price quality by arbitraging
prices and equalizing them across differ-
ent trading venues. Because of the mar-
ket power of algorithms, there is the risk
that overly mechanic thinking and potent
algorithms may perturb the price forma-
tion process. Naturally it would be de-
sirable to capture the positive effects of
algorithmic trading and to dampen the
potentially negative ones. There may be
more than one way to reach this aim.
A simple ban of algorithmic trading, as
sometimes demanded by certain politi-
cal circles, cannot serve to reach this dif-
ficult aim. This would mean to also de-
stroy many preferable effects of algorith-
mic trading. Of course, a distinction of
algorithmic and “normal” trading is not
easy. And certainly market participants
would program algorithms that operate
in the gray area to hide their true nature.
Currently, regulatory bodies are dis-
cussing possible means (Dombert 2011).
The often contemplated lower boundary
for limit order lifetimes is regarded scep-
tically. The comprehensible reason is that
an efficient risk management of orders
would be drastically complicated – es-
pecially, but not exclusively, in volatile
markets. Dombert (2011) proposes an al-
ternative that is worth discussing. With
an order-transaction-ratio, the number
of orders divided by the number of trans-
actions would have to remain above some
exogenous constant.
In our view, a European regulatory
framework is desirable that defines the
playground for all market participants.
Within this framework, it should be left
to the trading venues how they wish to
treat algorithmic trading in the context
of their business model. Then it would
be up to them if they wanted to attract
algorithmic trading or to limit it in spe-
cific market conditions. Such a “menu-
approach” leaves it in essence to the in-
dividual trader if he or she wishes to
face the competition from algorithms
with all their positive and negative ef-
fects or evade them by trading on trading
venues with appropriate restrictions that
apply always or under specific market
conditions.
5.5 Conclusion
As long as algorithms operate in the
dark, there is a profound uncertainty
about the effect of their activities. There-
fore, algorithmic trading is partly in con-
tradiction to fundamental principles of
stock exchanges: bringing buyers and
sellers together in a transparent manner.
On stock exchanges, trust is paramount.
The opacity of algorithmic trading –
as comprehensible it may be from the
point of view of their operators – un-
dermines this principle. Currently, there
is no level playing field. However, it
is equally important to enable techni-
cal progress, which algorithmic trading
with its high-quality information pro-
cessing definitely is. An improved avail-
ability of data and associated scientific
research can help to develop reasonable
regulatory frameworks for algorithmic
trading. With the increasing importance
of this way of trading in mind, there is
less and less reason to doubt that the im-
plementation of appropriate regulatory
frameworks should have a high priority.
Arne Breuer
Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Burghof
University Hohenheim
6 High Frequency Trading –
A Central Bank View
The capital markets are currently at an
important juncture in their development.
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Roughly half of all stock and foreign ex-
change trades conducted on the major
exchanges are no longer initiated by hu-
man traders; instead, they are the prod-
uct of computer algorithms that are able
to analyze large volumes of data and ini-
tiate hundreds of orders in fractions of
a second. Humans are increasingly being
eliminated from the immediate decision-
making process relating to the sale and
purchase of assets and being replaced by
software programs.
The speed with which orders are exe-
cuted has become to be the most impor-
tant factor and is now measured in milli-
and microseconds. New practices such as
“co-location” or “quote stuffing” – plac-
ing huge quantities of buy or sell orders
which the instigator intends to cancel al-
most immediately before they are exe-
cuted – have become important instru-
ments in the battle for the most rapid or-
der execution. Fundamental data on the
value of the respective securities or cur-
rencies are of no, or only subordinate,
importance for HFT algorithms.
In HFT, positions are usually held for
between a number of milliseconds and
several hours. In today’s high-speed mar-
kets, the scales are no longer tipped in
favor of the investor who is best able to
assess the true value of an asset, but of
the investor able to trade fastest. True
investments are becoming increasingly
rare.
Since the “flash crash” of May 6, 2010
(a roughly 15-minute phase of unusual
and irrational volatility on the New York
Stock Exchange), HFT has been called
to the attention not only of the general
public but also of regulators and central
banks.
Numerous observers regard HFT as a
new technical means of executing exist-
ing trading strategy rather than a strat-
egy in its own right. Advantages in terms
of speed have, they say, always been an
essential component of many successful
trading strategies. Seen from this per-
spective, HFT is not a completely new
phenomenon, but rather a technical evo-
lution of the securities markets. HFT
should be regarded merely as an overar-
ching term covering a multitude of differ-
ent fields of use. Among the many tactics,
several of the most important are based
on providing liquidity in stock market
trading (market making). Others can be
included under the category “statistical
arbitrage” and use algorithms to swiftly
identify and exploit profitable trading
opportunities based on price data. Oth-
ers belong to a category known as liq-
uidity detection, in which traders try to
seek out hidden large orders in order
books. Many critics term this “preda-
tory trading”, and it is suspected of being
unfair and potentially damaging to the
market.
Against this complex background, any
assessment of HFT and all discussion
relating to potential regulation should,
where possible, be limited to the un-
derlying HFT strategy. From a central
bank perspective, a sweeping judgment
on HFT is therefore neither appropri-
ate, nor would it serve to improve the
regulatory framework for transparency,
stability and efficiency. That means that
both the advantages and disadvantages of
HFT need to be evaluated very specifi-
cally. Statements that HFT is in general
either good or bad for the market should
therefore be viewed with caution.
HFT players and exchange operators
are at pains to stress that overall HFT
perceptibly improves market liquidity
and the efficiency of price discovery
(McEachern Gibbs 2009). The majority
of investors benefit from reduced bid/ask
spreads – a common measure of liquid-
ity, they say. This statement is backed
up by several scientific studies (Gomber
et al. 2011). However, there is increas-
ing evidence to suggest that, especially
in very volatile market situations, HFT
could prove problematic and could addi-
tionally destabilize the market (Brogaard
2010). This must be investigated and, if
found to be true, regulators must step in
to limit the risks for the financial system.
The flash crash demonstrated that the
liquidity generated by HFT market mak-
ers, which usually keeps transaction costs
low, may suddenly evaporate in difficult
market phases (NANEX 2010). Unlike
regular “human” market makers, who are
obliged to remain in the market even in
times of extremely volatile prices, HFT
traders are generally not bound by such
constraints. In good times, HFT traders
therefore crowd out normal market mak-
ers and often even perform their role bet-
ter, to the advantage of all market players.
In difficult markets, however, there is a
risk that trading flows could collapse with
all the attendant problems for the mar-
ket as a whole, as HFT players withdraw.
To many market participants, the nar-
rower bid/ask spreads and higher trad-
ing volume generated by HFT therefore
only represent “sham liquidity”. For this
reason there have been calls from various
quarters to oblige HFT market makers to
remain in the market even in times of
high volatility, similar to the obligations
imposed on normal market makers (EC
2010). In other words, they should start
to take some responsibility for the mar-
kets which they have, to date, merely used
to their advantage from their superior
position.
From a regulatory perspective, HFT
has proven problematic not only in these
rare but dramatic high volatility events,
but also in daily trading activities. While
bid/ask spreads have dropped signifi-
cantly in recent years thanks to HFT
market makers, the average period for
which such players hold positions has
dropped sharply. According to a study on
the flash crash, most HFT market mak-
ers close out their positions after no more
than roughly 10 seconds (Kirilenko et
al. 2011). That means that the stabiliz-
ing effect in the event of heightened mar-
ket volatility exerted by “normal” market
makers has given way to a “hot potato
effect”, where falling shares are merely
passed around at lightning speed.
As HFT has become more widespread,
the number of buy and sell orders has in-
creased dramatically in recent years. The
tactic known as quote stuffing, which is
used by several HFT algorithms, is partic-
ularly problematic. For reasons of trad-
ing strategy, the HF trader places a large
number of orders per second, only to
cancel them again almost immediately
before execution. The very high cancel-
lation rate this causes leads to a marked
divergence between apparent market liq-
uidity and actual trading volume. An in-
vestor placing an order in response to
a bid or ask is therefore often unable
to carry out the transaction at the limit
shown. Although the explicit transaction
costs appear low, the implied costs may
be much higher. Apparent market liq-
uidity and the size of bid/ask spreads
are therefore not by themselves reli-
able indicators of market liquidity and
efficiency.
An analysis of 1,172 trading days on
the New York Stock Exchange from 2007-
01-01 to 2011-09-14 that was carried out
recently by the research firm NANEX
showed that there were just 35 billion real
transactions for 535 billion quotes. The
quotes-to-trades ratio needed to gener-
ate US$ 10,000 in real transaction vol-
ume moved from roughly 6–7 at the be-
ginning of 2007 to 60–80 in mid-2011.
Higher figures indicate a less efficient
market: more information is required to
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achieve the same trading volume. Sud-
den and dramatic spikes in the number
of quotes are increasingly being observed
for individual US stocks, with individ-
ual HFT algorithms generating several
tens of thousands of quotes per second
for several seconds. Such bursts of activ-
ity are frequently accompanied by what
are known as “mini flash crashes”, where
securities lose 20%, 40% or even more
than 50% of their value in a space of sec-
onds for no fundamental reason, only to
recover shortly afterwards. For instance,
according to the SEC, the United States
has witnessed more than 100 such in-
explicable crashes since mid-2010 which
are suspected of being caused by HFT
algorithms.
Sending bids or asks is similar to send-
ing spam email: both are virtually free for
the sender, but not for the recipient. For-
warding and processing such large vol-
umes of data causes a lot of problems
and high costs for exchanges and mar-
ket participants. Systems are often over-
loaded, which is seen by many observers
as one of the causes of the flash crash. To
make matters worse, certain HFT algo-
rithms send some of these quotes only to
cause other traders or algorithms to act in
a certain way, which they can, in turn, ex-
ploit. As a consequence, an ever increas-
ing number of institutional investors are
transferring their transactions away from
normal exchanges to “dark pools”, where
it is usually more difficult to make a profit
in HFT.
The above-described criticisms intend
to show that HFT is a controversial is-
sue, requiring an exact analysis of the
details. In addition to “market friendly”
strategies that regulators regard as posi-
tive for the market – for instance, statisti-
cal arbitrage – there are also “unfriendly”
strategies that are seen as worrying. Oth-
ers are basically welcome but when actu-
ally applied on the market entail prob-
lems and dangers which should be elim-
inated. HFT market making is just such
an example.
When considering the ultimate ques-
tion of whether there is a correlation
between HFT and market efficiency, it
should be borne in mind that market ef-
ficiency mainly means that the price of
an asset adjusts to fundamental changes
in its value rapidly. It is not immediately
clear how HFT algorithms can contribute
to that, as decisions are based only on
the status of the order book in the last
few seconds or indicators based on tech-
nical analysis. A block trade of 10,000
shares between two well-informed large
investors represents true price discovery
on the market. By contrast, shifting 100
shares back and forth between two HFT
algorithms in innumerous times makes
no equivalent contribution to trading ef-
ficiency, even if this takes place at im-
pressive speed. A market that is mainly
dominated by HFT is also a market where
most orders have lost all connection to
fundamental factors. And this correlation
between price and fundamental value is
what should, in the main, determine the
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